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Abstract
Tax competition between two countries is considered in a trade-and-location setting with
di®erentiated products and monopolistic competition. There are two groups of workers, mo-
bile ones and immobile ones. Taxes are used for producing a public good. It is shown that
an equilibrium with mobile workers dispersed across countries is destabilised by increased
taxes on these mobile workers|and this is shown to be true also for perfectly coordinated
tax increases. It is also shown that an agglomeration is taxable, and that increasing public
spending may relax the minimum tax pressure on immobile workers consistent with preserv-
ing an agglomeration.
JEL Classi¯cation: F12, F15, F21, R12
Keywords: agglomeration, economic geography, tax competition
1 Introduction
Regional agreements of economic integration such as EU and NAFTA aim at achieving free
mobility of goods, people, capital, and services. There is a widespread recognition of the
potential bene¯ts of this in terms of higher allocation e±ciency and increased competition. At
the same time, however, local and national politicians, particularly in smaller regions, worry
about the locational e®ects economic integration might have. In particular, there are widespread
fears that locational competition by means of taxes will grow more ¯erce as economic integration
proceeds. As a consequence it has been suggested that the next step must be harmonization of
taxes.
The analysis of tax competition for mobile factors has a long tradition in economics. The
point of departure for this literature is the coexistence of immobile and mobile factors of pro-
duction in a group of politically sovereign jurisdictions, and the question to what extent public
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1goods can be ¯nanced by means of taxes on mobile factors. A recurrent observation is that
taxation of the mobile factor will be distorted downwards compared to a situation where all
factors were immobile. The reason is the obvious externality that one jurisdiction's tax reduc-
tion exerts on other jurisdictions|tax revenue lost by others when mobile factors move are not
internalised. This externality was observed by e.g. Oates (1972) and Gordon (1983), and as-
pects of the small-number case have been treated by e.g. Wildasin (1988) and de Crombrugghe
and Tulkens (1990). The basic result that taxes are distorted downwards has been quali¯ed
along several lines; Wilson (1987) devises a model where symmetric jurisdictions end up charg-
ing di®erent taxes and where this, in turn, leads to an ine±cient distribution of public goods
(and an ine±cient pattern of trade); Persson and Tabellini (1992) show how tax competition
may be mitigated in political equilibrium due to voters' strategically electing more tax-prone
governments. Wildasin (1997) develops a model with risky human-capital investment in the
presence of tax competition; he shows that labour market integration is unambiguously bene¯-
cial if the investments can be ¯nanced privately, whereas it is detrimental to immobile workers
if it requires tax ¯nance. The main focus of the tax competition literature is the taxation of
mobile capital; this model, on the other hand, is tailored to address taxation of mobile labour.
Whereas this is somewhat di®erent, both constitute examples of taxation of mobile factors; the
substantive di®erence between our paper and the tax competition literature is the way in which
the goods space and the production are modelled.
A completely di®erent strand of literature is the \new economic geography" literature, which
analyses the relationship between trade integration and industrial location. In a series of seminal
papers by Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996), it is shown
how economic integration may lead to increased concentration of industrial production. This
literature is based on the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz framework of increasing returns to scale and
monopolistic competition, together with trade costs. A key feature is that these models display
hysteresis in location, meaning that once production has agglomerated in a region it tends
to get stuck there because of demand and supply linkages. These linkages are an important
explanation for the industrial clusters that can be observed in many real world regions such as
the manufacturing belt of the US and the European \hot banana". A consequence of this is
that mobile factors may not respond to marginal changes in tax rates if they are locked in by
the existence of an industrial cluster. This stands in stark contrast to a standard neo-classical
framework, where a marginal tax change in a region leads to a marginal movement of factors.
This paper uses the Forslid and Ottaviano (1999) version of the Krugman (1991) model to
study the e®ect of taxes on the location of manufacturing production. The model is extended
by including proportional taxes on the two categories of labour, and tax revenues are spent on
country-speci¯c public goods. Analysing tax competition in an economic-geography framework
makes it possible to unveil forces absent in the traditional tax competition literature. First, the
scope for taxation depends crucially on wether production is agglomerated or dispersed. The
inertia introduced by agglomerative forces constitutes a fundamental reason for taxes not to
2be `minimal' when the mobile factor is concentrated|location economies then produce taxable
rents. (This force has been identi¯ed in somewhat di®erent contexts by Ludema and Wooton
(1998) and by Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup (1998).) Second, the stability of an
equilibrium where the mobile factor is dispersed may be a®ected by taxes. In particular taxes
that redistribute between mobile and immobile factors can have dramatic e®ects on the location
of production. In fact, it turns out that even perfectly coordinated tax increases on the mobile
factor may destabilise a symmetric equilibrium. In contrast, tax changes that are uniform across
factors only have gradual e®ects on the location of production. These observations have, as far
as we know, not been made previously.
Few attempts have been made to date to address issues of tax competition in an economic-
geography framework. An important exception is Ludema and Wooton (1998). In a framework
with homogeneous-good oligopoly and moving costs (as opposed to the di®erentiated-product
approach taken here), they focus on the e®ects of integration on the intensity of tax competi-
tion. They conclude that integration interpreted as decreasing trade costs, contrary to popular
notions, attenuates tax competition; integration interpreted as increased labour mobility has
mixed e®ects. One key conclusion of Ludema and Wooton is con¯rmed below; the inertia result-
ing from concentration of the mobile factor in one region gives, essentially, rise to a rent that
is taxable. This latter conclusion is borne out also in Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup
(1998); more precisely they show that a country hosting an agglomeration may ¯nd it optimal
to levy a source-based tax on capital income.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the model is developed and the stability
properties of a symmetric equilibrium are related to the parameters of the model|in particular
the e®ects of varying trade costs are considered. In Sections 3 and 4, taxes are introduced;
the analysis ¯rst deals with the properties of `symmetric' equilibria|i.e. equilibria where the
mobile factor is dispersed|and then goes on to the properties of equilibria where the mobile
factor is concentrated in one country. Section 5 is a conclusion.
2 The Model
This paper uses the Forslid and Ottaviano (1999) version of the Krugman (1991) model. Quali-
tatively the modi¯ed model behaves exactly like the original model but in addition it is analyti-
cally solvable. An additional attractive feature of the modi¯ed model is that the geographically
mobile factor can be interpreted as skilled labour while unskilled labour is immobile. This makes
the model more applicable in a European context.1 The model is extended by including pro-
portional taxes on the two categories of labour, and tax revenues are spent on country-speci¯c
public goods.
1There is evidence that more highly educated labour is more mobile; see e.g. Pedersen (forthcoming).
32.1 Basics
There are two countries, 1 and 2 (interchangeably referred to as regions), and two sectors. A
homogeneous good is produced with a constant-returns technology using only unskilled labour,
while di®erentiated manufactures are produced with increasing-returns technologies using both
skilled and unskilled labour. Each region has LU unskilled workers which are geographically
immobile. Skilled workers, amounting to LS
W worldwide, can migrate between countries. All






where ¹ 2 (0;1) and ° > 0 are constants, CA is consumption of the homogenous good, and G
is the level of a public good produced in the region where the individual resides. Manufactures










N being the number of varieties consumed, ci being the amount of variety i consumed, and
¾ > 1 being the elasticity of substitution.








The unit factor requirement of the homogeneous good is one unit of unskilled labour. This
good is freely traded, and since we also choose this good as numeraire we have pA = wU = 1
(wU being the wage of unskilled workers) in both countries.
In the production of di®erentiated goods, skilled workers only enter the ¯xed cost; this may
be interpreted as the cost of R&D or headquarter services. The variable costs only consist
of wages to unskilled workers. The world supply of skilled workers LS





j is the number of skilled workers in region j. The cost of producing
xi units of manufactured commodity i in region j is
Âj = ®wS
j + ¯xi; (4)
where wS
j is the wage rate of skilled labour in region j, ® is the ¯xed cost of skilled labour, and
¯ the requirement of unskilled labour per unit x. We will choose units of skilled labour so that
® = 1. Trading the manufactured good involves a frictional trade cost of the \iceberg" form:
in order for one unit of the good to arrive, ¿ > 1 units must be shipped.






4of each di®erentiated commodity; choosing units of x so that ¯ = (¾ ¡ 1)=¾ gives pj = 1. If
there is free entry, the excess of variable revenue over variable cost must precisely cover the
¯xed cost (dropping superscript S on mobile-worker wages),
(1 ¡¯)xj = wj; (6)
implying that
xj = ¾wj: (7)
2.2 Short-run equilibrium
In the short run, the allocation of skilled workers is taken to be ¯xed. Full employment of this
factor implies that the number of ¯rms in region j, nj, satis¯es
n1 = LS
1; n2 = LS
2: (8)
The model is closed by the M-sector market-clearing conditions, where the left-hand sides
(supply) are derived from (7) and the right-hand sides follow from the demand functions in (3)















The object Á = ¿1¡¾, ranging between 0 and 1, stands for "freeness" of trade (0 is autarchy
and 1 is zero trade costs). Incomes are given by
Y1 = LU + w1LS
1; Y2 = LU +w2LS
2: (11)
Equations (8), (9), (10), and (11) determine the nominal wage in each region for given factor
stocks. The endowment of skilled labour determines the size of the manufacturing sector and
therefore also the fraction of unskilled labour that is allocated to manufacturing. The amount
of unskilled labour in manufacturing equals n¯x. Substituting x and n from (7) and (8) gives
n¯x = (¾ ¡1)wSLS. We rule out corner solutions by assuming that (¾ ¡1)wSLS < LU, which
ensures that the agricultural sector is active in both regions.
2.3 Long-run equilibrium
In the long run, the skilled workers are mobile between regions and responsive to the incentives














5where Pj is the ideal CES price index in region j,
P1 = (n1 +Án2)
1=(1¡¾) ; P2 = (Án1 + n2)
1=(1¡¾): (13)
We are going to focus on two kinds of equilibria. On the one hand, we will consider `symmet-
ric equilibria', or more generally `dispersed equilibria'; i.e., equilibria where the mobile factor is
not concentrated in one region. On the other hand we will deal with `concentrated equilibria',
or `agglomerated equilibria'; i.e., equilibria where all manufacturing production is concentrated
in one region.
2.4 Stability




W=2, and all other objects equal across regions. Consider ¯rst this symmetric equilibrium
with public goods and taxes excluded from the analysis (formally: with G removed from the
utility function). In the case of free trade (Á = 1) it is easy to check that real wages are always
equal. This is no surprise since distance disappears from the model when trade costs are zero.
Consequently the equilibrium allocation of workers is undetermined. When trade costs are















The symmetric equilibrium is stable if ¹ < ¾ ¡ 1, which is assumed to hold. This condition
corresponds to the "no-black-hole" condition in the original core-periphery model.2
The two special cases of free trade and prohibitive trade costs (Á = 1 and Á = 0) can be
analysed analytically in most location models. The more interesting case of intermediate trade
costs is, however, not analytically tractable in standard models. Here, due to the simplicity
of the demand functions in (9) and (10), we can solve the model analytically for general trade









¡¸¹(Á2 ¡ 1)¡ ¸¾(Á ¡1)2 + (¹+¾)Á2 +¾ ¡¹
¸¹(Á2 ¡ 1)+ ¸¾(Á ¡1)2 + 2¾Á
µ
Á¸ +1 ¡ ¸




where ¸ ´ LS
1=(LS
1 + LS
2). Equation (15) expresses the relative real wage as a function of the
state variable ¸ and parameters of the model.
Two agglomeration forces are at work. On the demand-side, more skilled workers and ¯rms
in a region imply a larger market and therefore a more attractive place for additional ¯rms and
skilled workers to locate. On the supply-side, a larger region produces more varieties locally and
therefore, with positive trade costs, has a lower price index. This implies a higher real wage,
2See Fuijita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
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which attracts even more skilled labour and ¯rms. In equation (15) this supply link can be seen
as the last right-hand side parenthesis. Against the agglomeration forces stand trade costs as a
dispersion force. Higher trade costs make it less attractive to serve markets via exports, which
tends to disperse production.
Figure 1 plots relative utility (which, since public goods are absent, is simply relative real
wages) as a function of the proportion of manufacturing workers residing in country 1, ¸, for
di®erent levels of trade costs. For high trade costs the symmetric equilibrium is stable, as the
cost of supplying a market by exports is too large. For lower trade costs agglomerative forces
come to dominate, which leads to a core-periphery outcome, and for intermediate trade cost
the possibility of intermediate asymmetric equilibria appears. These equilibria are, however,
unstable. This model, thus, behaves qualitatively exactly as the Krugman (1991) model. Figure
1 plots (15) for ¾ = 3, ¹ = 0:3; and di®erent levels of trade costs.
It is also straightforward to evaluate analytically the stability of di®erent equilibria by
di®erentiating (15) with respect to ¸ and evaluating the derivative in the equilibrium of interest.
The symmetric equilibrium (¸ = 0:5) becomes unstable for trade costs lower than a certain
"breakpoint"; in term of freeness, Á, the breakpoint is given by:
Ábreak =
(¾ ¡¹)(¾ ¡1 ¡¹)
(¾ +¹)(¾ +¹ ¡1)
: (16)
The breakpoint is decreasing in ¹ and increasing in ¾ by inspection. A larger expenditure
share on manufacturing, ¹, increases agglomeration forces, which implies that the symmetric
equilibrium is stable for a smaller range of trade costs. A larger ¾ works in the opposite direction
since it implies a lower mark-up in manufacturing and therefore lowers agglomeration forces.
7Next, we turn to the agglomerated equilibrium. The core-periphery equilibrium cannot be
sustained for trade costs above the "sustainpoint", which|in terms of freeness|is given by:
Ásust =
s
(¾2 ¡¾ ¡¹(3¾ ¡1))(¾ ¡¹)
(¾2 ¡¾ +¹(3¾ ¡1))(¾ +¹)
: (17)
As in the Krugman (1991) model Ásust < Ábreak, which implies hysteresis in location. Once
the core-periphery equilibrium is reached, trade costs have to rise above the breakpoint (which
preserves the symmetric equilibrium) before the agglomerated equilibrium becomes unstable
(compare ¯gure 4 which plots stable equilibria against taxes). As ¹ goes towards zero the
manufacturing sector disappears, and the breakpoint and sustainpoint both converge to one.
3 Taxes|dispersed equilibrium
We will assume that the two regions can impose proportional taxes, tA
j on unskilled-labour
income and tM
j on skilled-labour income, initially taking taxes as fully exogenous. Note that
since average taxes are the key determinant of the long-run equilibrium, this speci¯cation may
be seen as shorthand for more general tax structures that are able to tax the two categories of
workers di®erently. Furthermore, we will assume thatthere is anupper bound on the possibilities
to tax immobile labour; in precise terms, we will assume that, tA
j ￿ TA. This restriction has
a natural interpretation as either a subsistence requirement, or as a proxy for some kind of
political constraint.
We will assume that tax revenue is used to produce a region-j public good, and to avoid
intractable interactions, we will assume that the public good is produced by means of the
average consumption basket; i.e., a fraction 1 ¡ ¹ of the tax revenue is spent on agricultural
goods, and a fraction ¹ on manufactures. An implication of this is that determination of
short-run equilibrium is independent of taxes. The amount of the public good is equal to the





Before we turn to the analysis we note that in order for skilled workers to stay in each of
the regions, it must be true that the ratio between the indirect utilities of mobile workers in
















When performing various comparative statics exercises on a dispersed equilibrium|i.e., any
equilibrium de¯ned by (19)|it may seem that this relationship is necessarily upset. As will
be shown, however, equilibrium is restored by migration of mobile labour. We will keep to the
8original model by assuming that workers myopically migrate to the more attractive region; as
long as the stability of the dispersed equilibrium is preserved, migration of workers will thus
restore equilibrium de¯ned by (19) when taxes change. As will also be clear below, however,
taxes may change the stability properties of a dispersed equilibrium.
3.1 Stability and comparative statics of the dispersed equilibrium
As we have noted, absent taxes there is always a symmetric equilibrium, and whenever trade
costs are su±ciently high this equilibrium is stable. We will now explore how the symmetric
equilibrium|and more generally any dispersed equilibrium|is a®ected by tax rates and the
resulting amounts of public goods provided. The relative utility is obtained by substituting (18)
into (19). Note that nominal wages do not depend on taxes since taxes do not enter equations
(8), (9), (10), and (11). The e®ect of taxes can therefore be analysed separately from the
determination of wages an price indices.
Taxes that are symmetric between factors but di®er between countries Consider ¯rst

























Since nominal wages do not depend on taxes, the e®ect of taxes can be analysed separately from
wages and price indices in (20). Clearly the e®ect of taxes is bell-shaped in the sense that low
taxes, on the one hand, imply a low provision of public goods which decreases the attractiveness
of a location, whereas high taxes, on the other hand, imply a large decrease in disposable income
which is again negative for utility. The welfare maximising tax is t¤ = °=(1+°), which increases
with the importance of public goods in utility, °.
Figure 2 shows a numerical example for ¿ = 1:6; ¾ = 4, ° = 1 and ¹ = 0:3. For these
parameter values, taxes are below t¤ so country 1 attracts more workers as it increases taxes.
The tax change, however, does not a®ect the slope of the relative indirect utility curve; as
will be elaborated on below, this is due to the tax on mobile workers not changing relative
to the tax on immobile workers. This type of general tax changes will, therefore, not cause
catastrophical agglomeration. Rather, taxes that are uniform across factors will a®ect the level
of manufacturing production in a country continuously. In fact, this case looks much like the
standard result in a neoclassical model where a marginal change in taxation will have a marginal
e®ect on location.
Taxes that redistribute between factors Next we assume that taxes are symmetric be-




2 = tA; but
tM 6= tA: Taxes now redistribute between the two factors. The relative utility is given by
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LUtA + (1 ¡¸)LS
Ww2tM¤°: (21)
Consider ¯rst a higher tax on mobile workers. As will be discussed below, the term wjLS
j
increases with immigration, this being one source of the potential instability of a dispersed
equilibrium. A higher tM magni¯es the e®ect of the term wjLS
j , and this is the reason for high
taxes on mobile labour to destabilise a dispersed equilibrium. A higher tA, on the contrary,
decreases the relative importance of tax revenues from skilled workers and stabilises the equi-
librium. The intuition is that the \technology" of public-good provision adds an additional
agglomerative force to the model; this through the economies|essentially an instance of scale
economies|of a larger population sharing the cost of a given level of provision of the public
good. The strength of this force at a dispersed equilibrium depends on the amount of public
good that is ¯nanced from mobile-labour income; the higher are taxes on mobile labour|and
consequently the more of the public good is provided|the stronger is the reason to reside in a
more populous region.
Figure 3 provides a numerical example for ¾ = 4, ¹ = 0:3, ° = 1, and ¿ = 1:35. Taxes on
unskilled workers are held at 0.3 while taxes on skilled workers are changed symmetrically in
both countries.
Tax changes can thus have dramatic e®ects on the location of manufacturing. Compar-
ing with Figure 1, a higher tax on skilled workers has qualitatively the same e®ect as trade
liberalisation|it rotates the relative indirect utility anti-clockwise. As taxes on skilled labour
are set above a critical value|the \breakpoint"|the symmetric equilibrium ceases to be stable.
For a country worryingaboutloss of manufacturing as aconsequence of economic integration,
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11taxes become imperative. A tax that redistributes from immobile factors to mobile factors will
counteract the e®ects of economic integration. Put di®erently, if countries integrate economically
harmonization of taxes may not su±ce to preserve the location of industry. Harmonization and
lowering of taxes on skilled workers (or increasing taxes on unskilled workers) may be necessary.
Figure 4 shows the con¯guration of long-run equilibria for di®erent tax levels on skilled
workers. The symmetric equilibrium (¸ = 0:5) ceases to be stable as taxes are increased above
the \breakpoint," at which a bifurcation occurs. At this point all manufacturing (and skilled
workers) agglomerate in one of the regions. The ¯gure illustrates the important feature of this
type of model that it displays hysteresis in location: Once the tax rate is moved marginally
above the breakpoint and a core-periphery structure is established, it is not enough to lower
taxes back to its previous level to re-establish a symmetric equilibrium; taxes have to be lowered
well below the breakpoint (to the \sustainpoint") before a symmetric equilibrium again becomes
stable and the core-periphery structure ceases to be stable.
General tax changes|stability We will start the general analysis by considering the sta-




2 . As is indicated by ¯gures 2 and
3, the impact of taxes on the stability of a dispersed equilibrium depends on the relationship
between taxes on mobile labour and taxes on immobile labour. The direction of this e®ect turns
out to hinge on the fact that skilled-labour income, wjLS
j , increases as more skilled workers move
to a region; this can be shown by solving the model.3 Due to this fact|total mobile-labour
wages increasing with the number of mobile workers|a dispersed equilibrium is destabilised by
taxes on mobile workers; this is shown in the Appendix. Furthermore, it can be shown that
the extent to which a dispersed equilibrium is destabilised depends on taxes through the ratios
tM
j =tA
j in the respective regions, and that it depends positively on each of them; the argument
can found in the Appendix. This property was re°ected above|taxes that were symmetric
between factors turned out not to a®ect stability, while redistributive taxes turned out to do
so.
General tax changes|comparative statics Consider next the general comparative stat-
ics of a dispersed equilibrium. As is indicated by ¯gure 2, the comparative statics of the share of
high-skilled workers in region 1, ¸, as a function of taxes has the natural property that|at a sta-
ble equilibrium|making region 1 more attractive to high-skilled workers leads to immigration.









Since @½=@¸ < 0 at a stable equilibrium, a tax change will lead to immigration precisely if ½
increases; that is, precisely if the relative indirect utility of a high-skilled worker increases in
3Evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium dwL
S=d¸ = 8Á¾¹Lu=
£
(¾ ¡ ¹)((¾ + ¹)Á
2 + 2¾Á + ¾ ¡ ¹)
¤
> 0,
where ¸ is the proportion of mobile workers residing in country 1.
12region 1. Similarly, any change in region-2 taxes that makes region 2 less attractive for mobile
workers will lead to immigration in country 1. Obviously, a completely symmetric argument
applies to country 2.
Finally, consider the actual impact of tax changes in the general case of (19) with no con-
straint on the pattern of taxes. Taxes introduce a factor






















high taxes on immobile workers are always conducive to keeping mobile workers. Hence, if
country 1 has such an objective, it will set tA
1 = TA. The e®ect of higher tM






















and country 1 will wish to increase it as long as this expression is positive. Expression (25) is
decreasing in tM
1 , and it is positive at tM




that is, provided that the income of high-skilled workers in region 1 weighted by the importance
of the public good in utility is large enough relative to the tax revenue from immobile workers.









A country wishing to attract mobile workers will increase tM
1 to the point where ´1 is no longer
increasing. Provided that (26) is satis¯ed at tA
1 = TA, it is thus optimal|from a strictly
locational point of view|to tax the mobile workers at a positive rate. The intuition for this
result is that the tax revenues from unskilled workers do not result in a high enough provision
of public goods, and therefore skilled workers prefer a positive tax rate.
Discussion If politicians only care about the level of manufacturing production the analysis
above leads to the following conclusions: When taxes are spent on public goods, it may be
optimal for a country|even if it is considering only locational aspects|to tax the mobile
factor at a positive rate. Indeed, a higher general tax rate can lead to more industry if tax
rates are initially low; even if taxes are high, however, an increasing general tax rate (i.e., a
tax rate uniform across sectors) leads to a gradual loss of industry rather than a catastrophical
agglomeration.
The question of distribution of taxes between mobile and immobile workers, on the contrary,
becomes critical. Although a positive tax on the mobile factor may serve to make a location
13more attractive when the maximal tax revenues from the immobile factor are insu±cient, it is
nevertheless true that a tax increase on mobile workers will destabilise a dispersed equilibrium.
The important point is that redistributive taxes a®ect the agglomerative forces, and they can
therefore have dramatic e®ects on the equilibrium con¯guration of industry. A higher tax rate
on mobile workers destabilises the symmetric equilibrium and may lead to a dramatic loss of
industry due to self-reinforcing agglomeration forces. Importantly, this will be the case even if
the high taxes on skilled workers are harmonized between countries.
3.2 Political equilibrium
Let us contemplate the above results in the light of competition between two countries for
mobile workers. Since workers move mechanically towards the country with a higher indirect
utility, it is clear that any situation where a country does not maximize the indirect utility of its
mobile workers cannot be an equilibrium: The country in question could improve the situation
of the mobile workers presently residing there and at the same time create an in°ow of workers.
Thus, a political equilibrium must be a situation where each country maximizes
Vj = kwjP
¡¹









subject to the subsistence constraint for immobile workers. As we have seen above, this solution
entails the subsistence constraint being binding, tA
j = TA. We have also seen that the optimal
tax rate on mobile workers is strictly positive if condition (26) is satis¯ed at tA
j = TA.
If the countries are fully symmetric, this shows the existence of a fully symmetric political





2 = tM¤, tM¤ being the solution to (27) if condition (26) is satis¯ed at tA
j = TA,
and zero otherwise.
This conclusion must be quali¯ed if \political-equilibrium taxes"|i.e., taxes maximising
(28)|are so high that the symmetric equilibrium is destabilised (cf. ¯gure 3). Since we do not
model the dynamics of the break-down of a dispersed equilibrium, we cannot make de¯nitive
statements about \transition values" of parameters with respect to the two kinds of equilibria.
It seems clear, however, that the symmetric equilibrium will break down when it is unstable
at taxes maximisng Vj in (28)|it is not in the interest of any country to reduce taxes on
mobile workers below this level unilaterally since that country seems to be the likely loser in the
contest for hosting the agglomeration. Thus, once trade-costs are low enough to undermine the
symmetric equilibrium at political-equilibrium tax rates, agglomeration seems to be the likely
outcome.
The emergent conclusions are that whereas the notion that immobile factors are likely to
be taxed very heavily due to competition for mobile workers is supported, the notion that this
leads to very low taxes for mobile workers themselves is not.
Welfare aspects The welfare consequences of the above results are extremely clear-cut, albeit
quite important. In short, if the objective is to attract mobile workers and the activities coming
14with mobile labour, the political equilibrium is one where the welfare of mobile workers is
maximized subject to a feasibility constraint derived from the extent to which immobile labour
can be taxed. This outcome is, obviously, unlikely to coincide with an unconstrained welfare
optimum. One shouldnotice, however, thatthe situationconsidered|viz. one where workers are
costlessly mobile and where their utilities are equalised across countries|is a very competitive
one; as will be clear below, the inertia implied by agglomeration is a mitigating factor.
4 Taxes|agglomerated equilibrium
Whenever trade costs are small enough, there is an equilibrium where one country is the host
of all manufacturing. Consider a situation where all manufacturing is concentrated in country





where N denotes the total number of manufacturing ¯rms in the world. The sales of the ¯rst





In order to attract workers to region 2 the ¯rms must pay









where w1 = 2¹LU=(¾ ¡ ¹)LS
W from equations (8), (9), (10), and (11). If the ratio of sales
(pro¯ts) is larger than the ratio of costs the ¯rm will defect from region 1. The condition for

















A condition for an established agglomeration to be stable is therefore º ￿ 1. The expression
can be decomposed into two factors|one depending on trade costs and the other parameters
of the model, and one depending on taxes|each with the property that increasing it makes
concentration in country 1 less likely.









This term is non-monotonic in trade costs as shown in Figure 5, which plots ´ for ¾ = 4 and
¹ = 0:3.
For a large range of trade costs the scope for taxation of the mobile factor is increasing
with trade integration (falling trade costs) reaching a maximum at the bottom of the U-curve
























in Figure 5. (This result can also be found in Kind et al. (1998).) Interestingly the relation
between taxes and trade costs are exactly the opposite in the case with dispersed production,
where lower trade costs decreases the scope for taxation of skilled labour. For very low trade
costs (the downward sloping segment in Figure 5), however, trade liberalisation again decreases
the scope for taxation of the mobile factor.
Next consider the factor depending on taxes; because of concentration,
G1 = tA
1 LU + tM
1 w1LS = tA




; and G2 = tA
2 LU; (34)
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(again with the property that increasing it makes concentration in country 1 less likely). Con-
















This expression shows combinations of tax rates that \keep agglomerative forces constant"; e.g.,
if µ0 is chosen in such a way that º in (32) is equal to one, it shows the lowest tax on immobile
labour|the lowest tA
1 |that is consistent with agglomeration in country 1.






A higher tax rate on lowskilled workers makes a location more attractive for the mobile
skilled workers, since it implies a higher provision of public goods. Therefore if region 2 increases
its tax rate on lowskilled worker's income so must region 1 to maintain the relative attractiveness
of region 1 for skilled workers. Further, a higher tax on skilled worker's income in region 2 makes
this region unambiguously less attractive; the small mass of workers that moves to region 2 get a
negligible share of the public goods paid by the tax. Atax on region-1 skilled worker's income has
two opposing e®ects on the attractiveness of a region; it decreases disposable income of skilled
workers, but it also increases the provision of public goods. These two e®ects are re°ected by
the two RHS terms in equation (36). For very high tax rates the ¯rst term will always dominate
implying that higher taxes on skilled labour makes the location less attractive. For low tax
rates, however, it is possible that the second term dominates so that the increased provision of
public goods associated with higher taxes makes the location more attractive. Figure 6 shows
the lowest tax on low-skilled workers compatible with agglomeration in country 1 as a function
of the tax on high-skilled workers in such a case.
Thus, the insight that an agglomeration constitutes a somewhat immobile tax base is borne
out in this context as well. The potential for the set of feasible taxes to be U-shaped as indicated
in Figure 6 has an interpretation: As one moves along the curve, the amount of public goods
increases.4 This means that the public sector is minimal at tM
1 = 0; this, however, is not the
point where the tax on low-skilled workers is minimal. Hence, there is not a trade-o® between
4This is obvious: as one moves to the right, t
M
1 increases and the utility of high-skilled workers is held constant;
thus public-good provision must increase.
17protecting an immobile tax base from heavy taxation and sustaining public expenditures in this
region. Although this is merely a possibility, and although it is true only for small taxes, it is
an important quali¯cation of the widespread notion that this is an unavoidable trade-o®.5
One may note that the subsistence constraint for immobile workers, tA
j ￿ TA|which
turned out to be binding in political equilibrium in tax competition when manufacturing was
dispersed|need not be binding in any one of the countries in political equilibrium in tax com-
petition when manufacturing is concentrated. Taxes consistent with the host country keeping
the agglomeration were described above; for the other country, maximizing the welfare for the
remaining|immobile|workers seems to be the obvious goal, and this is likely to involve less
than maximal taxes. In this sense, the agglomerated case is thus somewhat less competitive.
4.1 Comparing the symmetric and the agglomerated case
Perhaps the most salient feature of the analysis is that the natural inverted U-shape of utility
as a function of taxes when taxes are used to ¯nance public goods \survives" tax competition,
both in a dispersed equilibrium and in an agglomerated equilibrium. This is true in the sense
that there are forces tending to keep tax rates positive also on mobile labour in both kinds of
equilibria|although the strength of these forces are moderated by tax competition. Another
important feature of the analysis is that taxes on mobile labour in addition to repelling mobile
labour also destabilise dispersed equilibria.
A noteworthy di®erence between the symmetric and the agglomerated equilibria is that
the relation between trade liberalisation and the scope for taxes on mobile factors are exactly
reverse in the two equilibria for a large range of trade costs (the segment with positive slope in
Figure 5). Another way to put this is that, in this model, it matters with whom a region or
country is integrating. A highly industrialised country, caring about its industrial base, would
gain more tax independence as trade is liberalized with a developing country, since the reason
for tari®-jumping into the developing country is diminished.6 If the same country liberalises
trade against another highly industrialised country, however, the result is stronger competition
for mobile skilled workers. This gives less scope for independent taxation.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the e®ect of taxes and public goods on the location of mobile factors using
a \new economic geography" model. In these models ¯rms face pecuniary externalities in large
markets, which creates agglomerative forces as well as hysteresis in location. The paper contains
several conclusions. Changes in the overall tax level have locational e®ects quite similar to those
5Granted, when taking aspects such as the content of public expenditures into account, the likelihood of a
downward-sloping part of the curve may be smaller still.
6Of course other reasons to relocate, such as abundance of cheap low skilled workers, does not enter this
model.
18in the standard tax competition literature, where tax changes give gradual e®ects on location of
mobile factors. Taxes that a®ect the distribution between mobile and immobile factors, however,
can have dramatic e®ects since they a®ect the agglomerative forces. A small redistribution from
mobile workers to immobile workers may render an equilibrium with mobile labour dispersed
unstable, and cause a catastrophical agglomeration where all manufacturing production and all
skilled workers end up in one country. Notably, this e®ect can result from a tax increase that
is perfectly coordinated across countries|the instability originates in high tax levels on mobile
workers per se, not from di®erent taxes across countries.
From the trade and location literature it is well known that trade liberalization may trig-
ger agglomeration. As illustrated in this paper this outcome may be avoided|or at least
suspended|by changing taxes so as to redistribute from the immobile factor to the mobile
factor. In the face of economic integration thus, shifting of the tax burden from mobile labour
to immobile labour may be an e®ective means to halt concentration of the mobile workers.
Another conclusion that follows from the analysis is that an agglomeration, once established,
produces rents that are taxable, and that taxes are not generally driven down to some minimum
in the country hosting an agglomeration. This observation has been made previously by Kind
et al. (1998) and by Ludema and Wooton (1998). Moreover, our model points to the possibility
that for some tax levels, there is not a trade-o® between protecting immobile workers from
excessive taxation and sustaining a certain level of public-good provision|the minimal tax on
immobile workers consistent with keeping the agglomeration of mobile workers is not necessarily
everywhere increasing in the amount of public goods provided.
Finally, comparing the two types of equilibria, the relation between trade liberalisation and
the scope for taxation of the mobile factor are reversed in the agglomerated and the symmetric
equilibria. When liberalising against a country without manufacturing industry the scope for
taxation actually increases, since the tari®-jumping argument for production in the other region
becomes less important. On the contrary, when trade barriers are lowered between two regions
with manufacturing agglomerations the competition for manufacturing is increased. Essentially,
agglomeration forces become more dominant as trade costs are lowered. This increases the
possibility that one region becomes dominant, so that the symmetric equilibrium breaks down
and all manufacturing industry and skilled workers end up in one region.
19Appendix
The stability of symmetric equilibrium with general taxes Denote the relative real




2 and let the component introduced by taxes be denoted µ. Relative


















Stability is determined by the derivative of ½ with respect to ¸ at the symmetric equilibrium,










Since real wages are independent of taxes, d!=d¸ is precisely the slope ½ absent taxes. The
e®ect of taxes thus depends on:
dµ
d¸












































Ww1)=d¸ is positive (which can be veri¯ed by solving the model as noted in the text),
and thus d((1 ¡ ¸)LS
Ww2)=d¸ negative, dµ=d¸ is unambiguously positive. The introduction of
public goods and taxes thus destabilises the symmetric equilibrium. The magnitude of this
e®ect depends on taxes, but the derivatives d(¸LS
Ww1)=d¸ and d((1¡¸)LS
Ww2)=d¸ do not since
short-run equilibrium is independent of taxes. The magnitude of the e®ect thus only depends


























showing that any country increasing the relative tax burden on mobile workers (measured by
tM
j =tA
j ) destabilises the symmetric equilibrium. Moreover|noting that the second term of (A.2)
\begins with" ! ¢ µ which is equal to one in any dispersed equilibrium|this is the full e®ect.
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